PANO – In summer 1965, as the South Liberation Army’s victories of Binh Gia, Ba Gia and Dong Xoai and local people’s political movement ruined the US strategic plans (Staley-Taylor and Johnson-McNamara) in its broad strategy called “Special Warfare”, the Saigon government fed by the USA was on danger of melt-down. To save the situation, the USA turned to another strategy named “Joint Warfare”, in which the US Government decided to send US expeditionary forces and troops of the USA’s allies to the South Battlefield. With their great military advantage in terms of weapons, equipment, maneuverability, firepower and troops numbers, the US Army swiftly organized a large-scale march in an effort to find and assault units of the Liberation Army.
Receiving reconnaissance reports about the presence of Regiment 1 named Ba Gia, a regular unit of Inter-Zone 5 in Van Tuong, Binh Son district, Quang Ngai province, commander of US Marine Division, Westmoreland quickly drew up a combat plan named “Starlight” with an aim of annihilating our unit and raising US troops’ status.
The enemy, indeed, had many advantages. They were active in choosing the operational ground that suited their operational tactics and experience. They could also conduct modern warfare operations, in which tanks, artillery, navy and airport could be used to support combatants in the battlefield. What was more, they mobilized a large number of troops for the operation. The participating units included US Marine Division 3 with a reinforcement totaling some 9,000 troops; 4 marine battalions, 2 infantry battalions of the Saigon army, an armored and tank battalion and artillery and engineering forces. Additionally, 6 landing vessels, 105 tanks and armored cars, 100 helicopters and 70 warplanes were also mobilized to be ready to support the operation.
On the night of August 17th, 1965, more than 10 warships of the US 7th Fleet were deployed in an arc, bombarding on Van Tuong village and nearby heights. On the morning of August 18th, a large number of US troops, including 4 marine battalions, a tank and armored battalion, 2 105mm cannon battalions, 6 landing vessels and aircraft started the operation, advancing toward Van Tuong.
After heavy shelling and bombing, enemy troops were divided into 4 contingents to attack Van Tuong from 4 directions. The first contingent from Chu Lai followed the road to Van Tuong while 2 contingents came from the sea and the remaining contingent landed from the air.
Diagram of Van Tuong Battle in August, 1965.
With an aim of wiping out our force in the shortest time, the enemy drove our troops in Van Tuong village, closed encirclement tight and used firepower to annihilate our troops. In that context, our units of Regiment 1 in close coordination with local militiamen calmly retaliated the enemy. Under the combat plan, our forces tried to slow down the enemy’s advancements from the North and Southeast, but concentrated forces on the Southwest battlefield. Our troops in that direction were positioned in carefully-camouflaged deep trenches and commanding positions to annihilate enemy airborne troops.
With good preparation, appropriate operational tactics and high resolve, our forces retook the initiative albeit in a passive position at first. When enemy attacking contingents moved close to the village, they caught in obstacles, spike-traps and mine fields laid by our forces; so they had to cluster together out of order. At that time our forces either maneuvered out of trenches to attack them or used firepower to decimate them.
The battle lasted until the evening and the enemy lost 4 companies. The enemy’s initial plan to quickly annihilate our forces in Van Tuong went bankrupt and enemy troops were pinned down outside the village. The enemy then shelled at the location from warships and helicoptered more troops to the battlefield from landing ships at sea. When it got totally dark, our forces stopped the battle. After the battle, the enemy lost some 900 troops, 22 tanks and armored cars, 13 aircraft. During the night, our forces secretly withdrew from Van Tuong.
The Van Tuong victory had a great historical meaning and reflected the revolutionary spirit, ingeniousness, bravery, resourcefulness and unyieldingness of the military forces and people of the South in general and Inter-Zone 5 in particular. If the Ap Bac victory served as an opening to our army’s and people’s high movement of “annihilating puppet army’s troops, the Van Tuong victory to another movement of “annihilating US troops”. What was more, the victory confirmed that the Vietnamese military and people were able to defeat the US Army with modern weapons and equipment.
Together with the Ba Gia victory, the Van Tuong victory left a number of lessons and experiences to the Vietnamese military and people in fighting against invaders. The first and most valuable lesson was the success in mobilizing the comprehensive strength of the people’s warfare and close coordination in operations between regular and local armed forces, and armed forces’ attacks and people’s uprising. Second, the operational command should be flexible in command and control in accordance with the emerging situation. Finally, commanders and troops should always bring into full play the fighting spirit, ingeniousness, creativity in operations.
Evaluating the Van Tuong battle, Party General Secretary Le Duan said: If the Stalingrad battle marked a turning point in the Soviet war protecting the Fatherland, the Van Tuong victory proved that the Vietnamese military and people were able to defeat the US Army despite its dominance of weapons and equipment.
Written by Nguyen Ngoc Toan Translated by Thu Nguyen
Đăng ký: VietNam News