First battle against US troops

Source: Pano feed

PANO – In early 1965, the Johnson-McNamara Plan, part of the US strategy in Vietnam (called the “Special Warfare”) in the 1961-1965 period, was in danger of bankruptcy. That directly affected the survival of the Saigon regime. In that context, in March 1965, the USA urgently sent more troops to South Vietnam with the aim of sustaining the Saigon government. On March 8th, 1965, US Marine Battalions 1 and 3 of Brigade 9 arrived in Da Nang, marking the official presence of the US Army in the South Vietnam Battlefield.


Expeditionary Brigade 9 landed in Chu Lai on May 7th, 1965. Photo from the Ohio State University

Expeditionary Brigade 9 landed in Chu Lai on May 7th, 1965. Photo from the Ohio State University



On May 7th, 1965, 6,400 US troops and 24 tanks of Expeditionary Brigade 9 landed in Ky Lien and Ky Ha communes (Tam Nghia and Tam Quang of Nui Thanh district at present) and started to build the Chu Lai base complex, which was expected to be the spring to attack revolutionary bases in the South.


To protect the Chu Lai base, the enemy posted one company to the Nui Thanh mount. The US company consisted of some 140 men with machine guns, mortars, other kinds of firepower and personal weapons. They were organized into three commanding positions with the support of 81mm mortars and DKZs. In addition, they would call artilleries, tanks and aircraft for support if necessary.


Confronting the new opponent with its firepower advantage and higher operational level more or less impacted the Vietnamese army’s and people’s psychology and made international friends question: Whether the Vietnamese army and people dare to fight the US Army? Can the Vietnamese military and people defeat the most battle-hardened army? How do the Vietnamese military and people fight the US Army?


To answer the questions, the Party Central Committee held the 11th meeting on March 27th, 1965 to set a political resolve: “To pin down the US troops to the South Battlefield and defeat the US will of aggression.” With the high resolve to fight US troops, General Nguyen Chi Thanh (at that time he was a member of Politburo, Secretary of the South Party Central Committee) spoke at the first conference of heroes of the emulation movement of the South liberation armed forces in Lo Go, Tay Ninh in May 1965 that South forces should fight, fight hard against US troops, and that via fighting our forces could find out the best way to defeat US troops. On that spirit, the Military Zone 5 Command instructed its affiliate units in Quang Nam province to wipe out a US unit in order to downgrade the reputation of the US troops, learn about their tactics, draw lessons and encourage our military force and people across the area to fight US troops.


Receiving the guidelines from the higher commands, Quang Nam province drew up a policy: “Until the South has not been liberated, the provincial armed forces and people should still fight and be ready to fight any combat opponent… The provincial armed forces and people are tasked to fight US invaders till the last in order to provide fighting experiences for the entire forces in the South and contribute to defeating the US will of aggression.”


After carefully observing, studying and grasping the routine activities of the US troops in the province, the Provincial Command chose the US unit stationed in Nui Thanh as the first target, and tasked Company 2 of Battalion 70 and Commando Detachment V26 to attack the target. The participating force also took an additional short training drive.


The Nui Thanh-Quang Nam Victory Monument

The Nui Thanh-Quang Nam Victory Monument



At 23.30, May 25th, our troops took positions near the barbed wire fences of the US base and were ready to attack. At 00.30, May 26th, our waiting troops did not hear the firing order of a gunshot from the command as planned so company commander Vo Thanh Nam ordered the leader of the detachment responsible for the main attacking direction to cast grenades to enemy gun emplacements in the first layer trench. After that, our troops in the North, Northeast and Southwest of Hill 50, at the same time, fired at enemy troops in the first and second layers of trenches. After 15 minutes firing, our troops advanced and occupied the two trench layers. A number of US troops were killed, the remainders fled to the third trench layer, using machine guns and M79 to stop the advancement of our troops. At 00.45 hours, the detachment responsible for the secondary attacking direction maneuvered to the main attacking direction in coordination with the major detachment. After 20 minutes fighting, our troops captured all the targets on Hill 50.


At the same time, friendly forces started to assault the nearby height of Hill 49. Grenades, gunshots and explosives resounded from the height. Friendly troops captured the second layer of trench but had to stop advancing due to enemy firepower from machine guns firing off from the third layer of trench. But friendly troops there quickly neutralized enemy firepower and advanced, broke down the enemy formation in the third trench layer and on the top and annihilated single small groups of enemy troops. The fighting did not take much time and friendly troops captured the height.


For the small height next to Hill 50, friendly troops wiped out all US troops there in a very short time. In short, after 30 minutes, our troops annihilated almost all the US company stationed on the mount of Nui Thanh and took the command of the situation.


The Nui Thanh victory was very important. Our forces broke through the enemy’s corridor protecting Chu Lai airport. More importantly, the victory caused fearful psychology among US troops on the first days of their presence in Vietnam on one hand, and created confidence in fighting US troops for the South armed forces and people on the other hand. It also confirmed that our troops were able to defeat the US Army. In fact, several valuable lessons were drawn from the Nui Thanh operations. First, US troops relied much on firepower support so our troops should get close to the targets and conduct close combat to deny enemy firepower. Second, the commando force could play an important role in removing obstacles and attacking the beachhead. Finally, the secret and surprise of operations were key to success.


Written by Pham Hong Thai Translated by Thu Nguyen




Đăng ký: VietNam News

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